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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
Exemption Of Life Insurance Cash Surrender Values
From Bankruptcy Proceedings In Maryland
In re Posin1
In bankruptcy proceedings, the Referee refused to allow
bankrupt to exempt from the schedule of his assets the
cash surrender value of several life insurance policies on
his life, payable to his wife as beneficiary.2 The Referee,
agreeing with the contention of the trustee in bankruptcy,
took the position that Article III, Section 44, of the Mary-
land Constitution, which puts a $500 limitation on the
amount of property exempt from execution,3 must be read
into Article 48A, Section 166 of the Maryland Code, which
purports to exempt the cash surrender value of all life in-
surance policies payable to the wife, children or dependent
relatives of the insured from all claims of creditors.' Such
a reading would subject the cash surrender value of the
policies to the $500 Constitutional ceiling on debtor's ex-
emptions. The United States District Court for Maryland
refused to follow this reasoning and allowed the full cash
surrender value to be exempt from the bankrupt's schedule
of assets. District Judge Watkins reasoned that a life in-
surance policy, being a chose in action, is not subject to
1183 F. Supp. 380 (D.C. Md. 1960) aff'd 284 F. 2d 300 (4th Cir. 1960).
21Bankrupt's schedule showed liabilities of $734,068.28 and assets of
$14,199.42. There were six life insurance policies plus a National Service
Life Insurance policy, the full cash surrender value of the NSLI policy
being allowed. The schedule of exemptions was as follows:
Wearing apparel ............. $ 25.00
W atch ....................... 4.00
Policy No. 2315410 ............ 392.35
Policy No. 2315411 ............ 78.65
$500.00
The referee refused to allow as exempt the remaining cash surrender value
of policy No. 2315411 and the cash surrender values of 4 other policies.
a MD. CoNsT. Art. III, § 44: "Laws shall be passed, to protect from execu-
tion, a reasonable amount of the property of the debtor, not exceeding in
value, the sum of five hundred dollars."
'5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 48A, § 166:
"The proceeds, including death benefits, cash surrender and loan
values . . . of any policy of life insurance or any annuity contract
upon the life of any person heretofore or hereafter made for the
benefit of or assigned to the wife or children or dependent relative of
such person, shall be exempt from all claims of the creditors of such
person arising out of or based upon any obligation created after
June 1, 1945, whether or not the right to change the named beneficiary
is reserved or permitted to such person. * * *
"A change of beneficiary or assignment or other transfer shall be
valid except in cases of transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors."
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execution, the term used in the constitutional provision,
and is, therefore, not subject to that limitation.
The trustee and Referee had relied primarily on In re
Jones,' where the court held in a supplemental opinion6
that the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy is
subject to Article III, Section 44. In the original decision
of that case, the District Judge had said that the cash
surrender value was not subject to creditors' claims in
that, though the insured had the right to change the bene-
ficiary, he had not done so and probably would not do so,
in the light of the general practice of holders of policies
with such a right. Therefore, there was no cash surrender
value payable to the bankrupt, his estate or personal repre-
sentatives. Before any order had been issued, the Supreme
Court held in Cohen v. Samuels, that an insurance policy
on a debtor's life is an asset of the insured in bankruptcy,
although the beneficiary is someone other than the insured,
if the insured has reserved the right to change the bene-
ficiary. The Court's decision was based on an interpreta-
tion of Section 70A of the Bankruptcy Act.8 Sub-division 3
of this Section states that among the property to which the
trustee gets title are powers which the bankrupt might
have exercised for his own benefit, but not those powers
which he might have exercised for some other person. The
Court reasoned that since the bankrupt could have made
these policies in question payable to himself, they fall
within sub-division 3. In view of the Cohen decision, the
District Judge filed a supplemental opinion in the Jones
case holding the policy to be an asset of the debtor and
thereby only exempt from debtor's schedule of assets
in bankruptcy if included in the $500 constitutional
limitation.9
In tacitly overruling the Jones case, District Judge
Watkins, in the instant case, based his decision on the dif-
ference between attachment on judgment and an execu-
tion, the term used in the constitutional provision. In
Himmel v. Eichengreen,10 the Maryland Court of Appeals
5 249 F. 487 (D.C. Md. 1917).
6 Id., 490.
'245 U.S. 50 (1917).
'66 STAT. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (1953).
' 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 83, § 8 exempts all money payable in nature of
insurance from execution or seizure in satisfaction of debt or claim upon
any judgment in any civil proceedings (with two exceptions not pertinent
here), but MD. CONST. Art. III, § 44 has the effect of limiting this exemp-
tion to $500. This applies to benefits received by the insured, and includes
benefit payments for sickness and accident insurance.
- 107 Md. 610, 69 A. 511 (1908).
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recognized this distinction in holding that an attachment
is not such an execution as was intended by the constitu-
tional provision. Professor Arnold, in an earlier issue of
the MARYLAND LAW REVIEW, 1 1 analyzed the problem of
attachment and execution, and anticipated a decision such
as the one in the instant case.
Article III, Section 44 uses the word "execution." A
chose in action has been held not subject to execution in
Maryland, 2 and an insurance policy is a chose in action."
It then follows that an insurance policy cannot be executed
upon.
The Supreme Court has held that policies exempt from
levy by creditors under state laws are also exempt under
the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 14 Section 6 of the Act gives
effect to exemptions provided by the law of the state in
force at the time of the filing of the petition, if the bank-
rupt has had a domicile within the state for at least six
months immediately preceding the petition.15 Section 70
provides for insurance policies of the bankrupt to pass to
the trustee, if no state exemption statute is found in the
bankrupt's state of domicile, but allows the bankrupt to
keep the policy if he pays the trustee the ascertained cash
surrender value of the policy.'" Consequently, whether
the trustee will be allowed to reach the cash surrender
value of bankrupt's life insurance will depend largely on
state exemption statutes.
Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.' 7 was a bankruptcy
proceeding arising under New Jersey law and involved
a statute, 8 although not speaking in terms of execution
or attachment, 9 similar in content to Article 48A, Section
166. The cash surrender value of the policy was held ex-
empt and did not pass to the trustee as part of the bank-
rupt's schedule of assets.
A New York statute allows exemption of cash sur-
render values of policies payable to a third person bene-
ficiary from the claims of trustees in bankruptcy, even if
Arnold, Life Insurance as an Asset Available to Creditors in Maryland,
6 Md. L. Rev. 275 (1942).
nHarford Bank v. Banking and Tr. Co., 165 Md. 454, 169 A. 315 (1933).
A widow's right of dower, being a chose in action, was held not to be sub-
ject to execution.
"Ritter v. Smith, 70 Md. 261, 16 A. 890 (1889).
, Holden v. Stratton, 198 U.S. 202 (1905).
' 52 STAT. 847 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 24 (1927).
1052 STAT. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (1953).
' 43 F. 2d 74 (3d Cir. 1930).
282 N.J. CoMp. ST. (1910) p. 2850 (INsURANcE LAW OF N.J. § 38), now
17 N.J.S.A. (1937) § 17:34-28.
"Ibid. "[T]he lawful beneficiary . . . shall be entitled to its proceeds,
against the creditors.... "
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the insured has the right to change the beneficiary.2" Under
the predecessor of this law,21 in In re Solomons,2 2 it was
held that although the cash surrender value of a policy is
exempt from the claims of the trustee, the claim must
have arisen after the enactment of the statute. In light
of this, the bankrupt was not allowed the exemption, the
particular claim having arisen prior to enactment.
The Illinois statute exempting proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy goes further than the Maryland statute in that
it states life insurance proceeds "shall be exempt from
execution, attachment, garnishment, or other process.... .23
In In re Schiar,24 a case decided under this statute, the
court held that although such proceeds are exempt, the
exemption would not be allowed, where the bankrupt's
children-beneficiaries were adults not dependent on the
bankrupt for support since the statute speaks of policies
payable "to a wife or husband of the insured, or to a child,
parent, or other person dependent upon the insured . ..."25
Where adult non-dependent children are beneficiaries
of the bankrupt's life insurance, one presented with the
Maryland exemption statute would have to look beyond
the bare words of the statute and construe the statute in
light of its apparent underlying purpose, in order to hold
similarly to the Schiar case. Article 48A, Section 166
exempts life insurance "for the benefit of or assigned to
the wife or children or dependent relative .... ,2" To ex-
clude non-dependent adult children, the word "other"
would have to be read into the statute before the word
"dependent." Such a reading might be justified since the
underlying purpose of a statute exempting life insurance
seems to be a desire to protect those actually dependent
for their welfare on the bankrupt.27 On the other hand,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has said that
"the better and almost universal rule is that such statutes
should receive a liberal construction in favor of the
debtor .... 2 8 A liberal construction might be held to in-
clude those non-dependent children.
0 27 MoKINN-E's CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y., Art. 7, § 166.
2INSURANCE LAW OF N.Y., ch. 33, § 55a (1927).
22 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. N.Y. 1932).
273 IL.. REV. STAT., ch. 73, § 850, p. 333 (1937).
" 179 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
Supra, n. 23. Emphasis added.
26 Supra, n. 4.
17 Lake v. New York Life Insurance Company, 218 F. 2d 394, 399 (4th
Cir. 1955) (dicta).
2Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F. 2d 873, 874 (4th Cir. 1929).
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The problem of a possible fraud on creditors by the use
of exempt life insurance proceeds is of concern to some
authorities.
"Consequently, a debtor wishing to shield money
from his creditors may take out insurance in favor
of his wife or some other qualified beneficiary, know-
ing that at any time he can make himself the bene-
ficiary and realize the cash value of the policy, either
by surrender or loan. It is thus practically a cash
asset, and the exemption is manifestly adopted to
abuse, particularly since.., no monetary limit is set
upon the exemption. ..."
Maryland appears to have erected safeguards against such
abuse by the provision in Article 48A, Section 166, which
makes changes of beneficiary or assignment or any transfer
valid unless the transfer is with the intent to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors. No cases in Maryland have tested
the effectiveness of this safeguard.
In any case, it now appears, in light of the well-rea-
soned opinion by District Judge Watkins, that in Maryland,
proceeds of life insurance on the life of the bankrupt pay-
able to his wife, children or dependent relatives will be
excluded from property passing to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy for distribution to creditors, if no elements of fraud
are present. Therefore, a legitimate concern of the bank-
rupt for the welfare of his dependents will be recognized
by the courts.
MELvIN D. HILL
2McLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY (1956) § 161,
p. 160.
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